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several efforts to introduce statistical thinking and probabilistic reasoning into forensic practice. These 
efforts have been met with mixed reactions—a common one being scepticism, or downright hostility, 
towards this objective. For probabilistic reasoning to be adopted in forensic practice, more than statistical 
knowledge will be necessary. Social scientific knowledge will be critical to effectively understand the 
sources of concern and barriers to implementation. This study reports the findings of a survey of forensic 
fingerprint examiners about reporting practices across the discipline and practitioners’ attitudes and 
characterizations of probabilistic reporting. Overall, despite its adoption by a small number of 
practitioners, community-wide adoption of probabilistic reporting in the friction ridge discipline faces 
challenges. We found that almost no respondents currently report probabilistically. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, most respondents who claimed to report probabilistically, in fact, do not. Furthermore, we 
found that two-thirds of respondents perceive probabilistic reporting as ‘inappropriate’—their most 
common concern being that defence attorneys would take advantage of uncertainty or that probabilistic 
reports would mislead, or be misunderstood by, other criminal justice system actors. If probabilistic 
reporting is to be adopted, much work is still needed to better educate practitioners on the importance 
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Over the past decade, with increasing scientific scrutiny on forensic reporting practices, there
have been several efforts to introduce statistical thinking and probabilistic reasoning into forensic
practice. These efforts have been met with mixed reactions—a common one being scepticism, or
downright hostility, towards this objective. For probabilistic reasoning to be adopted in forensic
practice, more than statistical knowledge will be necessary. Social scientific knowledge will be
critical to effectively understand the sources of concern and barriers to implementation. This study
reports the findings of a survey of forensic fingerprint examiners about reporting practices across
the discipline and practitioners’ attitudes and characterizations of probabilistic reporting. Overall,
despite its adoption by a small number of practitioners, community-wide adoption of probabilistic
reporting in the friction ridge discipline faces challenges. We found that almost no respondents cur-
rently report probabilistically. Perhaps more surprisingly, most respondents who claimed to report
probabilistically, in fact, do not. Furthermore, we found that two-thirds of respondents perceive
probabilistic reporting as ‘inappropriate’—their most common concern being that defence
attorneys would take advantage of uncertainty or that probabilistic reports would mislead, or be
misunderstood by, other criminal justice system actors. If probabilistic reporting is to be adopted,
much work is still needed to better educate practitioners on the importance and utility of probabilis-
tic reasoning in order to facilitate a path towards improved reporting practices.
Keywords: reporting; testimony; fingerprint; categoric; probability; attitudes
1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed increasing efforts to introduce probabilistic reasoning into forensic
practice—particularly in the pattern evidence disciplines. We define probabilistic reasoning in fo-
rensic practice as formally recognizing and articulating the uncertainties inherent in forensic inter-
pretation using probabilistic logic. Forensic statisticians’ efforts in these areas have primarily, and
understandably, been concentrated in their area of technical expertise: statistics. Therefore, these
†Email: scole@uci.edu
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efforts have been focused on such activities as developing statistical models (Neumann et al., 2006,
2007, 2012, 2015; Egli et al., 2007, 2014; Leegwater et al., 2017; Swofford et al., 2018), building
useful data sets (e.g. Zheng, 2016; CSAFE, n.d.), and developing quality metrics (Nill, 2007; Yoon
et al., 2012; Hicklin et al., 2013; Pulsifer et al., 2013; Kellman et al., 2014; Chugh et al., 2018;
Kalka et al., 2020; Swofford et al., 2021).
However, for probabilistic reasoning to be adopted in forensic practice, more than statistical
knowledge will be necessary. Probabilistic reasoning will have to be adopted by the current work-
force of forensic practitioners. It is not clear that this workforce is either knowledgeable about or
committed to a probabilistic approach. Indeed, some practitioners have expressed scepticism, or
downright hostility, towards probabilities and statistics (e.g. McKasson, 2001; Bush, 2009;
Jayaprakash, 2013).
In addition to statistical knowledge, therefore, social scientific knowledge will be necessary to ac-
tually enact the introduction of probabilistic reasoning into forensic practice. Such knowledge can
help us understand issues such as: whether and to what extent forensic practitioners understand
probabilistic reasoning; how better to educate practitioners in probabilistic reasoning; and whether
practitioners welcome the introduction of probabilistic reasoning or are actively resistant to it and
the reasons for, and sources of, such reactions.
The present study was intended to be a contribution to that effort. It used a survey of practitioners
in a single forensic discipline—friction ridge examination—and it focused on a single deployment
of probabilistic reasoning, which we call ‘probabilistic reporting’—that is, the reporting of forensic
findings in probabilistic (as opposed to ‘categorical’) terms. Friction ridge analysis was chosen be-
cause the researchers are familiar with the discipline and had connections with the large practitioner
community, it is a widely used and influential pattern evidence discipline, the debate over probabil-
istic reporting is familiar to many in the discipline, and statistical tools have been developed and are
familiar to the community. This study aims to capture baseline data on reporting practices across
the discipline in order to: (i) ascertain what kind of reporting language friction ridge examiners and
Forensic Service Providers (FSPs) currently use, and to what extent examiners and FSPs use prob-
abilistic reporting, (ii) gauge friction ridge examiners’ attitudes towards probabilistic reporting, and
the reasons for, or sources of, those reactions; and (iii) understand examiners’ characterization of
probabilistic reporting and what it means to report probabilistically.1
It is hoped that this study will be useful for scientists interested in fostering the use of probabilis-
tic reasoning in forensic science. It may also be of interest to forensic practitioners, laboratory
administrators, legal scholars, social scientists and others interested in the introduction of statistical
thinking into forensic practice. The findings may help these groups better understand the degree of
penetration of probabilistic reasoning that has already been achieved, the reasons practitioners may
welcome or resist the introduction of probabilistic reasoning, and how to improve education and
implementation efforts.
2. Background
Friction ridge impression evidence (colloquially referred to as ‘fingerprint evidence’) has long been
considered one of the most important kinds of forensic evidence used in criminal and civil litigation
1 The study originally had a fourth goal: to capture and record the experiences of latent print examiners who have
adopted probabilistic reporting. However, we received only 6 survey responses (2%) from such examiners. We deemed
this an insufficient sample, and we do not address this goal further here.
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and is often regarded by jurors and other criminal justice system actors as incontrovertible proof
that an individual touched an item in question (Lieberman et al., 2008; Garrett and Mitchell, 2013;
Koehler, 2016; Ribeiro et al., 2019; van Straalen et al., 2020). This is based upon decades of testi-
mony that fingerprint evidence is unique to an individual and that no two individuals, including
identical twins, share the same arrangement of friction ridge skin (Cole, 2001). Friction ridge exam-
ination consists of visual observation and comparison of friction ridge details between two impres-
sions. Traditionally, the process for conducting friction ridge examinations is described by the
acronym ACE-V, which stands for ‘Analysis’, ‘Comparison’, ‘Evaluation’, and ‘Verification’
(Ashbaugh, 1999). ACE-V has been described in the forensic literature as a means of comparative
analysis of evidence since 1959 (NRC, 2009).
For nearly a century, latent print examiners have expressed their findings in categoric terms with
statements or implications of absolute certainty, something also true of many other forensic disci-
plines (Bali et al., 2020). When we characterize reporting as ‘categoric’, we mean that reporting fol-
lows a system in which reports are assigned to ‘categories’ which are treated as homogeneous
within and mutually exclusive. For example, in friction ridge analysis, it is common to report results
in three categories often named ‘exclusion’, ‘inconclusive’ and ‘identification’. Although categoric
reporting does not require statements of certainty (and often allows for statements of uncertainty),
historically it has been common to treat one or both of the endpoints of categoric frameworks (i.e.
‘exclusion’ and ‘identification’ in the framework above) as statements either of certainty or of some
state of quasi-certainty that can be treated as tantamount to certainty (Cole, 2014). So, e.g. lay fact-
finders were often told that fingerprints ‘matched’ with ‘100% certainty’ and the two impressions
were made by the same source (Cole, 2007). Over time, terms such as ‘match’, ‘identification’, and
‘individualization’ became synonymous expressions, all of which meant that a specific individual
was determined to be ‘the’ source of an impression (Cole, 2014). Such claims have been criticized
as unsupportable by individual scientists and scholars (e.g. Robertson, 1990; Stoney, 1991;
Champod and Evett, 2001; Broeders, 2006; Meuwly, 2006; Saks and Koehler, 2008; Cole, 2009;
Page et al., 2011; Neumann et al., 2012; Eldridge, 2017) and a number of governmental and scien-
tific reports (NRC, 2009; Campbell, 2011; NIST, 2012; PCAST, 2016; AAAS, 2017). While this
article is not intended to review these debates, we summarize the criticisms as follows: First, state-
ments of certainty, to the extent that they are being made, are inherently misleading and unscientif-
ic—they systematically overstate the value of the evidence. Forensic results, particularly those with
an inclusionary outcome, cannot preclude the possibility of any considered hypothesis. Proper
reporting of forensic results should therefore account for the probability of the evidence under the
considered hypotheses and some probability, even if small, must necessarily be assigned to each hy-
pothesis (Aitken et al., 2010). Secondly, statements of certainty aside, categorical frameworks are
too simplistic. They treat all forensic results as equivalent, no matter how different, assigned to the
same category. And, they may overstate the difference between two forensic results that are quite
similar but fall on opposite sides of the arbitrarily defined boundary between two categories.
Ideally, then, forensic results should be reported along a continuum rather than in categories
(Champod and Evett, 2001). How this should be done is not something we will discuss in this art-
icle, but, to summarize, proposals range from expanded ‘verbal scales’ to expressing probabilistic
statements along a continuum. Methods for expressing probabilistic findings range from the use of
likelihood ratios to the use of accuracy data, and from the use of statistical models and associated
software to the use of subjective probabilities based on human judgement.
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The latent print discipline has responded with statements that limit strength of the claim that the
words ‘identification’ and ‘individualization’ are supposed to convey (Garrett, 2009; SWGFAST,
2013). These changes, however, insisted on retaining the terms themselves and the claim that ‘two
impressions were made by the same source’ while dispensing with the phrase ‘to the exclusion of
all others’, resulting in ensuing criticisms that the change had no practical impact (OSAC FRS,
2016; Cole, 2018). At least one crime laboratory, the United States Army Criminal Investigation
Laboratory (USACIL), the primary forensic laboratory supporting the criminal investigative mission
of the Department of Defense, announced a policy change to abandon the term ‘identification’ and
report their findings in a probabilistic framework (Defense Forensic Science Center, 2015). In 2017,
the USACIL went a step further and announced the implementation of a statistical software applica-
tion, FRStat, to provide probabilistic support to fingerprint associations (Defense Forensic Science
Center, 2017).2 In 2018, the Organization for Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) for Forensic
Science, Friction Ridge Subcommittee (OSAC FRS), which is responsible for the promulgation of
standards and best practices related to the forensic examination of friction ridge skin impression evi-
dence nationwide, released the proposed Standard for Friction Ridge Examination Conclusions
(OSAC FRS, 2018), which took an additional step towards ensuring a probabilistic expression.
While the proposed standard maintains the term ‘identification’, it was redefined in a probabilistic
likelihood ratio format (OSAC FRS, 2018). In addition to the revised definition, the OSAC FRS
states that ‘an examiner shall not assert that a source identification is the conclusion that two
impressions were made by the same source or imply an individualization to the exclusion of all
other sources’ (OSAC FRS, 2018).
This debate over reporting practices provides the context for the present study. However, the
purpose of this study was not to advance the debate for or against probabilistic reporting. Rather, it
was to try to elicit the perspectives of a practitioner community on the prospect of probabilistic
reporting.
3. Methods
3.1 Participant recruitment and survey administration
Participants were recruited to participate in the study by invitation through their membership in the
International Association for Identification (IAI), the largest professional organization of forensic
fingerprint practitioners in the world, and through word of mouth by members of the friction ridge
(fingerprint) community. The survey was emailed to approximately 1700 IAI members listed as
having background in friction ridge examination (see Appendix A for the recruitment email). On
the Study Information Sheet (but not in the Recruitment Email) participants were informed that they
2 The FRStat software is method developed by the USACIL designed to serve as a quality assurance tool and a means
of quantitatively conveying the significance of an association observed by an examiner. The FRStat development and val-
idation is described by Swofford et al. (2018) Briefly described, the FRStat first calculates a similarity value (called GSS)
between two sets of features identified by an examiner on two separate impressions which the analyst believes to corres-
pond. The software then provides two estimates, one indicating how often prints originating from common sources would
result in a GSS that is equal to or greater less than the calculated GSS and another indicating how often prints from differ-
ent sources would result in a GSS that is equal to or greater than the calculated GSS. The two values are then combined as
a ratio providing a single summary statistic indicating to what extent the GSS is consistent with originating from a common
source compared to different sources. Generally speaking, higher values of this ratio indicate greater evidence in favour of
the analyst’s opinion of association; lower values indicate less evidence in favour of the analyst’s opinion of association
and may serve as a quality assurance tool to flag a comparison as potentially problematic due to insufficient similarity to
support an association, based on the thresholds and standards set by an organization’s policies.
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would receive a Centre for Statistical Applications in Forensic Evidence (CSAFE)-branded coffee
mug for completing the survey. Eligible participants were forensic practitioners 18 years of age or
older. Participants were provided a link to an online survey using a commercial survey platform,
Qualtrics
VR
. All responses to the survey were anonymous. As will be discussed below, the survey
received a total of 301 survey responses.
The survey was open for a 2-month period during August and September 2018. After giving
informed consent, participants were presented with a series of questions pertaining to their demo-
graphics (gender, age and education), employment and testimony experience. Participants were then
provided a closed-response question in which they were asked to choose which of three sample
statements most closely resembled the wording they currently used in reports of an association be-
tween two friction ridge impressions (see Appendix B). The first option was meant to encompass a
variety of different ‘categoric’ ways in which friction ridge examiners tend to report and testify.
The second was intended to encompass the variety of ways in which friction ridge examiners cur-
rently try to testify ‘probabilistically’. The third, which we call ‘demonstrability’, was intended to
capture a kind of reporting currently advocated by some practitioners which emphasizes the ‘dem-
onstrability’ of the conclusions more than their probabilistic nature (Triplett, 2016). We refer to this
question as the ‘trigger question’ because it was used to initially divide the subject pool into two
groups, labelled ‘probabilistic’ and ‘categoric’, which were administered questions slightly differ-
ently in parts of the remainder of the survey.3 For purposes of this binary assignment, ‘demonstrabil-
ity’ respondents were aggregated with the ‘probabilistic’ group.4
Next, all participants were given an open-response question which asked them to provide the
actual language used in their written examination reports when reporting an association between
two friction ridge impressions in their practice. In a follow-up binary, closed-response question, par-
ticipants were then asked whether they believed their actual reporting language was ‘probabilistic’
or ‘non-probabilistic (categorical)’.
After being divided into two groups based on their responses to the trigger question, partici-
pants were administered a series of Likert-scale and free-response questions regarding
their positions towards probabilistic reporting. Likert-scale questions included five response
choices indicating the extent participants agree or disagree with the statements provided.
The Likert-scale response choices included: ‘strongly agree’, ‘somewhat agree’, ‘neither agree
or disagree’, “somewhat disagree,” “strongly disagree.” Likert-scale responses were evaluated
quantitatively and free text responses were evaluated qualitatively through researcher coding
and analysis using Atlas.tiV
R
software. The raw surveys and our coding are publicly available
through the CSAFE data portal.5
3 Participants responding to the trigger question indicating that their reporting language was ‘probabilistic’ were asked
to report their attitudes toward probabilistic reporting: (1) before making a change to probabilistic reporting and (2) after
making a change to probabilistic reporting (currently) in order to understand the degree to which their views have changed
over time, if at all. This group was also asked an additional set of questions concerning what was most and least effective
with helping the participant understand the importance of probabilistic reporting and gain comfort with reporting and testi-
fying using probabilistic conclusions. However, we received only 6 survey responses (2%) from examiners who have
adopted probabilistic reporting. We deemed this an insufficient sample, and we do not address this further.
4 We doubt that either forensic statisticians or the proponents of the approach themselves would consider the statements
associated with ‘demonstrability’ probabilistic. We combined these responses with the ‘probabilistic’ group because,
though not probabilistic, they do represent a desire to move beyond the conventional categoric approach, even if the dem-
onstrability approach still does consider itself categoric (Triplett, 2018).
5 https://data.csafe.iastate.edu/DataPortal/#
MT. EVEREST—WE ARE GOING TO LOSE MANY 5
3.2 Current reporting practices
3.2.1 Categoric versus probabilistic. The first aim of the survey endeavoured to capture current
reporting practices for associations between friction ridge impressions. This was accomplished
in two different ways. First, examiners were asked to choose from three fixed options (referred to
earlier as the trigger question). Secondly, we offered participants the opportunity to articulate their
reporting language in their own terms. Following this second probe, participants were asked to self-
report whether they believed the language they used was ‘probabilistic’ or ‘non-probabilistic (cat-
egorical)’. This second probe allowed us the opportunity to evaluate whether the submitted language
was or was not probabilistic and compare participants’ self-reports to our own evaluations. The free
text responses for which participants provided samples of the actual language used in their written
examination reports when reporting an association between two impressions were evaluated and
coded as ‘probabilistic’ or ‘non-probabilistic (categorical)’ independently by two of the researchers
using the criteria outlined below:
‘Statements are coded “Probabilistic” if they openly and transparently assign in any
way (verbal or numerical) a probability to the alternative hypothesis.
Statements are coded “Categorical” if they do not assign a probability to the alterna-
tive hypothesis or if they do assign a probability to the alternative hypothesis but, in
the same statement, minimize, belittle, or otherwise encourage the disregarding of
that probability.’
Coding discrepancies between the two researchers were reviewed by the third researcher and dis-
cussed until a consensus was reached. This design allowed us to compare participants’ self-reports
to our own evaluations of whether or not statements were probabilistic.
3.2.2 Types of categoric and probabilistic reporting. In order to achieve greater specificity
about the nature of the statements being used, we subdivided ‘categoric’ and ‘probabilistic’ state-
ments into two subcategories each. We subdivided categoric statements into ‘Traditional’ or
‘Elaborated’, following the nomenclature proposed by Bali et al. (2020). Traditional statements are
generally those kinds of statements that have pervaded the friction ridge discipline for the past cen-
tury. Elaborated statements are those that appear to recognize that the manner of reporting needs to
change, but appear to do so subtly. An example would be the redefinition of the term ‘individualiza-
tion’ by the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis Study and Technology
(SWGFAST) to mean ‘the decision that the likelihood the impression was made by another (differ-
ent) source is so remote that it is considered as a practical impossibility’ (SWGFAST, 2013). More
specifically, ‘Traditional’ statements (e.g. ‘the two prints are from the same source’; ‘this finger
made this print’; ‘the print was identified to the defendant’; ‘I made an identification’, etc.) assign
no probability to the alternative hypothesis. ‘Elaborated’ statements assign a probability to the alter-
native hypothesis but also minimize it with a statement that encourages disregarding it (e.g. ‘prac-
tical impossibility’, ‘negligible’, ‘discounted’, etc.).
We subdivided probabilistic statements into two categories according to the degree of rigor with
which the statements follow the logical and formal rules of probabilistic reporting (e.g. clearly
6 H. SWOFFORD ET AL.
articulating hypotheses) (Evett, 2015). Statements in the first category, which we call ‘Probability
of Findings’, tend to articulate two hypotheses and characterize the probability of the evidence.
Statements in the second category, which we call ‘Probability of Hypothesis’, tend to articulate only
one hypothesis and characterize the probability of the hypothesis (i.e. posterior probabilities) as
opposed to the probability of the evidence. Based on our reading of the statement, we believe the
‘Probability of Hypothesis’ statements represent ‘efforts’ to testify in a logical probabilistic manner
which have, like many efforts to speak probabilistically, inadvertently transposed the conditional
(Evett, 1995).
3.2.3 Support for probabilistic reporting (agency policy versus personal belief). In addition
to gaining a general understanding of the extent to which examiners report categorically versus
probabilistically, we were also interested in understanding the extent to which examiners support
reporting probabilistically. By asking examiners to report the statements that they use in their actual
reports, we may have captured agency policy rather than examiners’ personal beliefs. In order to
better understand examiners’ personal positions towards probabilistic reporting, thus capturing
whether such examiners may be at least open to the idea of a transition, we asked several questions
designed to elicit their personal beliefs about categorical and probabilistic reporting. These were
explored using the following Likert-scale response questions for all respondents:
‘I feel that the proposed shift away from “identification” and the use of probabilistic
language is an appropriate direction for the fingerprint community.
I do not understand why there is concern with expressing positive conclusions in abso-
lute terms, such as "identification.”
I support probabilistic reporting because it is a scientifically more appropriate means
of expressing positive fingerprint conclusions.
I do not understand why probabilistic conclusions are more appropriate means of
expressing positive fingerprint conclusions.
I am willing to take an active role in helping other practitioners become more under-
standing and accepting of probabilistic reporting.’
3.3 Attitudes towards probabilistic reporting
3.3.1 Receptivity to probabilistic reporting. The second aim of the survey endeavoured
to capture examiners’ attitudes towards probabilistic reporting and the reasons for, or sources of,
those reactions. This was accomplished in several ways. First, our survey question ‘I feel that the
proposed shift away from “identification” and the use of probabilistic language is an appropriate
direction for the fingerprint community’ probed the current state of examiners’ receptivity to prob-
abilistic reporting. Secondly, in order to gain greater insight into examiners’ views, we solicited a
free text response which invited participants to elaborate on why they agree or disagree ‘that the
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proposed shift away from “identification” and the use of probabilistic language is an appropriate dir-
ection for the community’. The free text responses were analysed in three groups according to
aggregated responses from the Likert-scale: (1) those who perceive probabilistic reporting as appro-
priate (i.e. those who responded ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly agree’); (2) those who perceive probabilis-
tic reporting as inappropriate (i.e. those who responded ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly disagree’); and (3)
those who were neutral as to the appropriateness of probabilistic reporting (i.e. those who responded
‘neither agree nor disagree’). Free text responses were single-coded by the second author in order to
derive themes that emerged from the data according to a grounded theory approach. The second au-
thor has been studying friction ridge analysis from historical, sociological, epistemological and rhet-
orical perspectives for more than 20 years and, therefore, is, we believe, sufficiently familiar with
the jargon of the discipline to interpret the responses. After a provisional list of themes was gener-
ated, the themes were re-evaluated, and some themes were aggregated, disaggregated or deleted.
The researcher then made a second pass through the data using this final list of themes. There was
no maximum placed on the number of themes which could be applied to any single response, but
the minimum was 1 to ensure the assignment of at least one theme to each response (i.e. if a re-
sponse did not fit any existing theme, a new theme was added).
3.3.2 General opposition to probabilistic reporting. In addition to the free text responses
allowing participants to elaborate on why they agree or disagree ‘that the proposed shift away from
“identification” and the use of probabilistic language is an appropriate direction for the community’,
we were also interested in understanding key reasons for the opposition in a more structured way.
We accomplished this by asking all participants several Likert-scale response questions designed to
elicit general reasons why they may be opposed to probabilistic reporting. The questions were
selected based on our anecdotal observations of examiners’ claims or implications at conferences,
online chat boards and informal discussions over the last several years:
‘I feel that law enforcement, special agents, and/or other investigators would not
understand how to interpret probabilistic conclusion language.
I feel that defense attorneys would take advantage of probabilistic conclusion lan-
guage to create reasonable doubt.
I feel that prosecutors would be less willing to use fingerprint evidence in court be-
cause of the probabilistic conclusion language.
I feel that judges and/or jurors would not understand probabilistic conclusion
language.
I feel that I do not sufficiently understand probabilities and would not to be able to
properly testify to my conclusion in court.
I feel that a probabilistic conclusion is too weak of a conclusion.
I feel that a probabilistic conclusion would negatively impact the outcome of a trial.
I feel that if I were to report and/or testify to probabilistic language that my certifica-
tion with the IAI would be in jeopardy.
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I feel that probabilistic reporting will cause the number of erroneous associations to
significantly increase.’
3.4 Characterizations of probabilistic reporting
The third aim of the survey endeavoured to understand examiners’ characterization of probabilistic
reporting and what it means to report probabilistically. Although the concept of ‘probabilistic
reporting’ has been advocated by proponents, it is unclear what examiners understand those words
to mean and whether they differ from one another. In a free-text response question, we sought to
allow the respondents to tell ‘us’ what they understood the term ‘probabilistic reporting’ to mean
with the following question: ‘How would you describe probabilistic reporting, compared to non-
probabilistic (categorical) reporting?’ For analysis purposes, we divided respondents into two
groups (categoric reporters and probabilistic reporters) based on the trigger question discussed
above. Using the same analysis procedures described in section 3.3.1 above, the free text responses
were reviewed by one of the researchers in order to derive themes that emerged from the data
according to a grounded theory approach.
4. Results
4.1 Participant responses
A total of 435 raw survey responses were received in the 2-month period the survey was open
(August and September 2018); however, 134 survey responses omitted the trigger question and
were largely incomplete or blank altogether, and we discarded them. Given that the survey was
made freely available on the internet, many ‘responses’ may have reflected individuals who pre-
ferred to view the survey, rather than complete it. After removing the incomplete surveys, a total of
301 completed surveys were available for evaluation—yielding a response rate of 17.7% out of ap-
proximately 1700 IAI members invited to participate. A completed survey, however, does not mean
that the respondent answered every question.
Of the 301 respondents who completed surveys, the demographics are as follows: 44% were
male and 54% were female (2% unreported), 88% reported being employed in the USA and
10% reported being employed outside of the USA, 83% reported having a Bachelor’s Degree or
higher, 84% have testified in court, 54% testified in court in the past year, the average years of
experience is 16.5 years (standard deviation of 11.2 years), and the distribution of participants’
ages was: 8% reported as 20–29 years, 36% reported as 30–39 years, 28% reported as 40–49
years, 19% reported as 50–59 years, 8% reported as 60–69 years, 2% reported as 70–79 years,
and 2% unreported.
4.2 Current reporting practices
4.2.1 Categoric versus probabilistic. Among the 301 completed surveys, all participants
responded to the trigger question with three fixed reporting options. The responses to this question
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that the vast majority of respondents (88%) use categoric reporting language.
Probabilistic reporting is rare (10%) and only 2% of respondents use ‘demonstrability’ language. In
short, 9 out of 10 friction ridge examiners surveyed responded that they report categorically.
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Among the 301 completed surveys, only 247 provided free text responses with a sample of their
actual reporting language. For those 247 respondents, we were able to code whether the reporting
language was categoric or probabilistic (coding discrepancies between the two researchers occurred
in 3 of the 247 responses—all three related to whether a categoric statement should be sub-coded as
‘traditional’ versus ‘elaborated’). Table 2 compares respondents’ self-reports with researcher cod-
ing. The self-reports for the smaller group of 247 respondents are consistent with those found in the
larger group of 301 (Table 1): 88% of examiners described themselves as reporting categorically
(Table 2, column 2). Surprisingly, even among the small number of examiners who purported to re-
port probabilistically, the majority of them, in our view, report categorically. Conversely, two
respondents described themselves as reporting categorically, but provided a sample statement that
we interpret to be probabilistic (columns 4 and 6).
Readers may wonder whether and why they should treat our assessment of whether a statement is
probabilistic as dispositive. We believe that readers who examine the statements for which we dis-
agreed with the participant’s self-report will find our assessments uncontroversial (taking note of
the definitions of these two categories we provide above). For example, one respondent self-
TABLE 1 Breakdown of fixed options of current reporting practices for associations.
Response Brief description n
Categoric Same source; identified to, matched 88% (264/301)
Probabilistic Likelihood same or different source 10% (31/301)
Demonstrability The conclusion is easily demonstrable to others 2% (6/301)
Examiners selected the samples of fixed reporting options that most closely resembled their own. The fixed
reporting options acted as a ‘trigger question’ to initially categorize respondents as reporting categorically or
probabilistically. The ‘demonstrability’ option was treated as probabilistic for purposes of this initial
categorization.
TABLE 2 Breakdown of categoric versus probabilistic reported based on respondents’ self-report compared
to researcher coding of the actual reporting language
1 2 3 4 5 6
Self-report Researcher coded Total (Researcher coded)
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reported that the following statement was ‘probabilistic’; however, we interpreted it to be categoric:
‘Identification is the opinion of an examiner that there is sufficient quality and quantity of detail in
agreement to conclude that two impressions originated from the same source.’ Conversely, another
respondent self-reported that the following statement was ‘categoric’—we coded it as probabilistic:
‘In the opinion of this examiner the likelihood that the impressions were made by a different source
other than the one listed is very small.’ A full listing of all the statements for which researcher cod-
ing conflicted with self-report is presented in Appendix C.
Table 2 suggests that categoric reporting is even more prevalent than the 90% figure found in the
self-reports. According to our coding of actual provided sample reporting language,6 98% of
respondents are using categoric statements to describe associations between friction ridge impres-
sions. Only 6 of the 247 respondents provided statements that we interpret as probabilistic.
4.2.2 Types of categoric and probabilistic reporting. Table 3 provides the breakdown of
respondents’ categoric statements subdivided as ‘traditional’ versus ‘elaborated’ and respondents’
probabilistic statements subdivided as ‘probability of findings’ versus ‘probability of hypothesis’.
4.2.3 Support for probabilistic reporting (agency policy versus personal belief). Table 4
shows the responses from participants who actually report categorically related to questions
designed to elicit their personal support for probabilistic reporting. As Table 4 shows, between 32
and 43% of respondents who report categorically responded in ways that suggest they personally
support probabilistic reporting.
4.3 Attitudes towards probabilistic reporting
4.3.1 Receptivity to probabilistic reporting. The first question on Table 4 shows the range of
responses on the Likert-scale to the question ‘I feel that the proposed shift away from
TABLE 3 Breakdown of categoric and probabilistic reporting into subtype based on determinations of cat-
egoric versus probabilistic from researcher coding (traditional versus elaborated for categoric and probabil-
ity of findings versus probability of hypothesis for probabilistic)









Probability of findings 2%
(4/247)
Probability of hypothesis <1%
(2/247)
6 Readers may wonder whether multiple participants from the same laboratory participated in the survey. The anonym-
ous nature of the survey precludes any insights into this.
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TABLE 4 Participants’ (categoric respondents based on researcher coding) responses to Likert-scale ques-
tions related to examiners’ personal beliefs and support for probabilistic reporting
Question Likert-measure Total Degrees of dis/
agreement
aggregated
I feel that the proposed shift away from ‘iden-
tification’ and the use of probabilistic lan-




















I do not understand why there is concern with
expressing positive conclusions in absolute



















I support probabilistic reporting because it is a
scientifically more appropriate means of



















I do not understand why probabilistic conclu-
sions are more appropriate means of



















Strongly agree 13% 34%
(Continued)
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“identification” and the use of probabilistic language is an appropriate direction for the fingerprint
community’ for respondents and then shows aggregations of the Likert-scale responses into broader
categories. From these data, we see most friction ridge examiners feel that probabilistic reporting is
not an appropriate direction for the community (58%). Few examiners are neutral on the issue
(10%). Among the 239 respondents with opinions (responding ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly dis/agree’ in
either direction), approximately two-thirds view it as inappropriate and one-third view it as appro-
priate. Although the proportion who view it as appropriate is far greater than those who actually
apply probabilistic reporting, the majority of the examiner community at large still remains general-
ly opposed to, or at least sceptical of, probabilistic reporting.
When invited to elaborate on why participants agree or disagree ‘that the proposed shift away
from “identification” and the use of probabilistic language is an appropriate direction for the com-
munity’ in a free text response, respondents expressed a wide diversity of opinions to this question.
Some respondents wrote long disquisitions, and at least one complained about the lack of space in
which to enter a response. The mean and median number of themes for each response was 3. The
minimum was 1 (our coding rules required the assignment of at least one theme to each response),
and the maximum was 8.
4.3.1.1 Respondents supporting probabilistic reporting Among the 85 participants who consider
probabilistic reporting ‘appropriate’ (i.e. those who responded ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly agree’ on
the first question in Table 4), a total of 36 different themes were identified suggesting ‘why’ they
viewed it as appropriate, and a total of 113 themes were coded across the 85 respondents. Table 5
shows all themes that were mentioned by more than one respondent. The full list of themes is avail-
able through the CSAFE data portal (see footnote 5).
The most common responses were that probabilistic reporting was an improvement over past or
current practice. This was most commonly described as either ‘more accurate’ or ‘more scientific’.
An example of a ‘more accurate’ statement is:
Table 4 (continued)
Question Likert-measure Total Degrees of dis/
agreement
aggregated
I am willing to take an active role in helping
other practitioners become more under-
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‘It is a more accurate description of my observations and the limits of my observa-
tions’ (38).7
An example of a ‘more scientific’ statement is:
‘I think it’s time for LP [latent print] examination to apply more scientific rigor to the
practice of latent print examination. This would include articulating probabilities
when reporting results of examinations. I would hope that this ultimately leads to
more credibility for friction ridge examination as a forensic discipline’ (416).
These respondents also viewed probabilistic reporting’s ability to convey uncertainty as an advan-
tage. For example, one respondent wrote:
‘We shouldn’t speak in absolute terms. Identification over estimates the evidence and
our conclusions should convey the level of certain [sic] we know. Even if we know
what we mean by identification it does imply to a jury absolute certainty. It’s not sci-
entific. I would like the field to be better (31)’.
TABLE 5 ‘Shift to probabilistic reporting is appropriate’: coded themes mentioned more than once (n ¼ 85)
Number Theme Frequency
1. More accurate 12
2. More scientific 12
3. Uncertainty 10
4. Jury clarity 9
5. Transparency 7
6. Weight of evidence 7
7. Finer 6
8. Uniqueness unproven 6
9. Objectivity 5
10. It’s happening 3
11. Statistic ok with verbal 3
12. Appropriate 2
13. Consistent with other disciplines 2
14. External scrutiny 2
15. Law 2
16. Overselling 2
17. Reliance on stock phrases/expertise 2
18. Sound reasoning 2
19. Step in right direction 2
7 All quotations or references to specific responses from the survey are followed by a parenthetical reference to the re-
spondent number. Respondent numbers were assigned to all respondents who opened the survey, including those who did
not complete it. Therefore, some respondent numbers are greater than the total number of respondents, 301. Spelling errors
in the responses are corrected, but grammatical errors are not.
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Several respondents specifically cited the ‘weight of evidence’, an important concept in forensic
statistics, as an advantage of probabilistic reporting. Many of these respondents perceived probabil-
istic reporting as offering greater ‘jury clarity’ and ‘transparency’ for the jury. This contrasts with
many respondents who do not support probabilistic reporting and cited ‘jury confusion’ as a reason
for their opposition (see below).
Overall, respondents offered a rich and diverse set of reasons for the appropriateness of probabil-
istic reporting. There was reference to epistemological considerations (e.g. ‘uniqueness unproven’;
‘objectivity’), external forces (e.g. ‘it’s happening’, ‘external scrutiny’, ‘law’), and perceived prob-
lems with current practice (e.g. ‘overselling’, ‘reliance on stock phrases/expertise’, ‘conclusions are
not overstated’). However, in contrast to the responses that probabilistic reporting is inappropriate,
those who consider it appropriate were characterized by a clearly perceptible degree of ambiva-
lence. Many responses coded as ‘appropriate’ listed some advantages of probabilistic reporting, but
then turned to some perceived disadvantage.8 An example is this:
‘It gives a more accurate representation of the validity of the conclusion and results
reported. However, I do worry it may confuse the issue in the event of a distracted/in-
attentive jury (419)’.
Recognizing the importance of this ambivalence, we coded such responses as containing ‘reserva-
tions’. Fully 36 of the 85 responses (42%) that considered probabilistic reporting appropriate con-
tained such reservations. Such ambivalence was not nearly as common among the responses that
considered it inappropriate, and so ‘reservations’ in those responses were not counted.
4.3.1.2 Respondents not supporting probabilistic reporting Among the 154 participants who con-
sidered probabilistic reporting ‘inappropriate’ (i.e. those who responded ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly
disagree’ on the first question in Table 4), a total of 49 different reasons were identified suggesting
‘why’ they viewed it as inappropriate, and a total of 265 themes were coded across the 154 respond-
ents. Table 6 shows all themes that were mentioned by more than one respondent. The full list of
themes is available through the CSAFE data portal (see footnote 5).
The most common response was that probabilistic reporting would confuse the jury:
‘Our job in court is to make the jury understand the evidence. I feel that the language
being referred to will just confuse a lay person (36)’.
For many examiners, the ‘confusion’ they feared lay in the move away from communicating
results in the simple form of certainty:
8 It is important to recall that in this analysis respondents were categorized according to their responses to the Likert-
scale question, ‘not’ according to researcher coding of their free-text responses. Thus, a respondent who reported that they
‘somewhat agree’ that probabilistic reporting is appropriate and submitted a free-text response criticizing probabilistic
reporting was still analysed in the ‘appropriate’ group. For example, the following free-text responses were made by
respondents who self-reported that they agreed or somewhat agreed that probabilistic reporting was appropriate: ‘I believe
much more study into the usage of probabilistic statements is required. Specifically, in district and county courts within the
US, not just military court as is currently being done’ (86); and ‘The shift towards probabilistic language seems contradict-
ory to the principles of fingerprint identification that I learned in my training years. I was taught to give definitive conclu-
sions—not maybes. Additionally, I worry that probabilistic conclusions may have the negative effect of increasing the
number of people being erroneously associated with a given latent print’ (374).
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‘This shift seems to add confusion. It’s giving some degree of uncertainty to our con-
clusions (185)’.
This contrasts with the respondents favouring probabilistic reporting who viewed ‘uncertainty’ as
an advantage.
A similar concern was invoked when examiners expressed concern about ‘underselling’—the con-
cern that probabilistic reporting is too ‘weak’ and would understate the probative value of the evidence:
‘No accurate or "full" way to express LPE’s opinions. The numbers are weak and
meaningless (413)’.
TABLE 6 ‘Shift to probabilistic reporting is inappropriate’: coded themes mentioned more than once (n ¼
154)
Number Theme Frequency
1. Jury confusion 36
2. Probability not ready 26
3. Underselling 23
4. Quantification impossible 18
5. Opinionization 15
6. Uncertainty can be eliminated 14
7. Misleading 12
8. Uniqueness 12
9. Wealth of empirical data 9
10. DNA paradigm inappropriate 7
11. Unnecessary 7
12. Appropriate in some cases 6
13. Combine probability with id 6









19. Sceptical of statistics as discip-
line/all models wrong
4
20. Customer is police/attorneys 3
21. Examiner confusion 3
22. Risk contradicting ground truth
more often
3
23. Transparency sufficient 3
24. Whole population problem 3
25. Accuracy more important 2
26. Defence exploitation 2
27. Does not prefer 2
28. Not science 2
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Compared to respondents who consider probabilistic reporting appropriate, some examiners cited
‘jury confusion’ to express the opposite concern: that probabilistic reporting would overstate, rather
than understate, the value of the evidence:
‘Until probabilistic language is valid and reliable, as well as easily understood by all
practitioners and easily explained by those practitioners to a judge and jury, they are
useless numbers. They provide to confuse the trier of fact, add little to the data, and
very likely will serve to bolster the testimony and evidence (24)’.
The second most common reason given was ‘probability not ready’. These respondents commu-
nicated that they were not opposed to probabilistic reporting in principle. Their opposition, rather,
was a practical consideration based on their perception of the current state of affairs with regard to
the development of a statistical model useable for assigning a probability to a friction ridge
association:
‘There is no current scientific basis for a probabilistic model. Reporting latent print
conclusions in probabilistic language is misleading and unscientific. Statistics are not
in themselves scientific or objective (254)’.
Some other common themes cited fundamental epistemological concerns about the use probabil-
ity to communicate the findings of friction ridge analysis. One such concern is ‘quantification is
impossible’:
‘I believe there cannot be probabilistic language involved with latent print examin-
ation. There are too many variables involved. Latent prints examination is too subject-
ive to have probability (169).’
These responses suggest the impossibility of quantification as deriving from the limits of friction
ridge analysis: it is inherently uncertain, subjective, and reliant on continuous rather than discrete
measures and, therefore, impervious to quantification. In contrast, other respondents resisted the
premise that friction ridge analysis is inherently uncertain, claiming ‘uncertainty can be eliminated’:
‘When I form the opinion that I have made an identification - I am certain that this is
the person. There is no probability of it being from someone else. If I am not certain
then I will not say it’s an identification but that I can not exclude them as being the
contributor (258)’.
‘Ident is ident I don’t see the purpose of assigning a probability number, it’s 100% or
I wouldn’t call it a ident (172)’.
A third such concern is reference to ‘uniqueness’:
‘Strongly disagree because it is impossible to apply a probability to something, any-
thing, that is unique. The scientific basis in biology and other natural sciences is well
established. Therefore, probabilistic language is inappropriate and unscientific (270)’.
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Some respondents expressed outright hostility towards the discipline of statistics, which was
called, e.g. a ‘bandwagon’ and a ‘fad’ (239). Another respondent commented:
‘The probabilistic method (not language) is put upon us because it is supposed to be
more scientific. It comes from the DNA science. I see that nowadays DNA evidence
in practice is accepted as Empirical fact in spite of statistical humdrum (296)’.
There was also some hostility expressed towards DNA, primarily for imposing an inappropriate
paradigm on friction ridge analysis. ‘Politics’, defence attorneys, defence experts and ‘critics’ were
also perceived as imposing the shift towards probabilistic reasoning on the discipline.
4.3.1.3 Respondents neutral to probabilistic reporting Among the 26 participants who were ‘neu-
tral’ as to the appropriateness of probabilistic reporting (i.e. those who responded ‘neither agree nor
disagree’ on the first question in Table 4), a total of 27 different reasons were identified, and a total
of 36 themes were coded across the 26 respondents. Table 7 shows all themes that were mentioned
by more than one respondent. The full list of themes is available through the CSAFE data portal
(see footnote 5).
4.3.2 General opposition to probabilistic reporting. Table 8 shows the responses to the
Likert-scale questions designed to elicit key reasons why examiners may be opposed to probabilistic
reporting and provides them in rank order based on the proportion of examiners who responded
‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ to each question.
4.4 Characterizations of probabilistic reporting
When asked to describe probabilistic reporting compared to non-probabilistic (categorical) reporting
in a free text response, 192 participants responded. Among those, 177 were respondents who had
self-reported that they report categorically and 15 were respondents who had self-reported that they
report probabilistically. Due to the small number of respondents indicating they report probabilistic-
ally, we only discuss the results of the 177 participants who indicated they report categorically.
Among the 177 categoric respondents, a total of 94 different themes were identified, and a total of
326 themes were coded across the 177 respondents. Table 9 shows all themes that were mentioned
by more than one respondent. The full list of themes is available through the CSAFE data portal
(see footnote 5).
The most common response characterized probabilistic reporting as the quantification, or at least
the communication, of ‘uncertainty’:
TABLE 7 ‘Neutral on shift to probabilistic reporting is appropriate’: coded themes mentioned more than once
(n ¼ 26)
Number Theme Frequency
1. Jury confusion 5
2. Truly undecided 4
3. Does not understand 2
4. Unnecessary 2
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‘Probabilistic reporting assigns uncertainty to each examination while non-
probabilistic reporting offers a conclusion (16)’.
The second most common response characterized probabilistic reporting in terms of
‘quantification’:
‘Using numbers, statistics, and/or frequencies to explain a conclusion rather than
words or descriptions (181)’.
As shown in Table 9, two of the more common themes that appeared in response to questions
about the appropriateness of probabilistic reporting also appeared in response to questions about its
definition: ‘jury confusion’ and ‘probability not ready’.
A number of specific technical statistical concepts appeared in the responses. The notion of ‘ran-
dom match probability’ appeared more frequently than ‘weight of evidence’. This is notable be-
cause the latter of the two terms better captures the current thinking among forensic statisticians,
especially with regard to pattern evidence, such as friction ridge analysis. For example, many
respondents described probabilistic reporting in terms of a random match probability:
‘I would describe it as using a statistic [sic] model to convey the likelihood of finding
someone else with the same characteristics in those prints (25).’
Slightly fewer described the weight of evidence:
‘Probabilistic reporting would involve some sort of calculation to give a weight to the
conclusion based on the information present in the known and unknown (180).’
TABLE 8 Participants’ (categoric respondents based on researcher coding) responses to Likert-scale ques-
tions related to possible reasons for opposition to probabilistic reporting (from Tables 6 and 7) in rank order
Key reasons for opposition to probabilistic reporting (in rank order) Agree or strongly
agree, % (n/N)
Defence attorneys would take advantage of probabilistic conclusion language to
create reasonable doubt
79 (211/266)
Judges and/or jurors would not understand probabilistic conclusion language 79 (209/264)
Law enforcement, special agents, and other investigators would not know how to
interpret probabilistic conclusion language
69 (184/265)
A probabilistic conclusion is too weak of a conclusion 48 (127/265)
I do not sufficiently understand probabilities and would not be able to properly
testify
44 (116/266)
A probabilistic conclusion would negatively impact the outcome of a trial 41 (110/266)
Prosecutors would be less willing to use fingerprint evidence in court 38 (100/266)
Probabilistic reporting will cause the number of erroneous associations to
significantly increase
28 (80/281)
My certification with the International Association for Identification would be in
jeopardy
15 (40/266)
Note: n’s vary by question.
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3. Jury confusion 17
4. Probability not ready 17
5. Random match probability 16
6. Weight of evidence 15




9. Likelihood ratio 9
10. Confusing for customer 7





16. Confusing to practitioners 5
17. Do not know 5
18. Sliding scale 5
19. Too weak 5
20. Underselling 5
21. Unnecessary 5
22. DNA model 4
23. Driven by critics/self-serving
agenda
4
24. Error prone 4
25. Statistical model 4
26. The way forward 4
27. Disaster 3
28. Misleading 3
29. More data to support conclusion 3
30. Possible associations 3
31. Problematic 3
32. Anti-ground truth 2
33. Consider with other evidence 2
34. Dropping exclusion of all others 2
35. Expectation of seeing similarity 2
36. Greater exploitation of evidence 2
37. Imprecise 2
38. Inappropriate 2
39. Insufficient weight 2
40. More accurate 2
41. Not opposite of categorical 2
42. Objective 2
43. Probability impossible 2
(Continued)
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The likelihood ratio, which is currently a very common topic of discussion in forensic statistics,
was mentioned more frequently than either random match probability or weight of evidence.
However, it was more common to describe the likelihood ratio incorrectly, with the conditional
inverted (Evett, 1995), than it was to describe it correctly. For example, one respondent correctly
characterized the likelihood ratio:
‘Probabilistic reporting puts a number on the result. In some models, that number is a
similarity score, sort of like the scores we get when we search a print in AFIS. In other
models, the number is a likelihood ratio, telling you how likely it is that the prints
having so many features in common come from the same source versus how likely it
is that prints having those features in common come from a different source (20).’
But others described it with the conditional inverted:
‘Instead of just saying "identification" which would be categorical reporting, probabil-




The usable response rate of 17.7% (301 out of approximately 1700 IAI members invited to participate)
poses a limitation on our survey. Viewed in combination with the recruitment scheme and voluntary
participation, it is difficult to know whether these responses were representative of the views of the la-
tent print examiner population at large. However, the demographics of our participants hint that our
participants were not an unusual subset of the IAI membership. Most of our participants were mid-
career latent print examiners between the ages of 30 and 50 years with testimony experience.
5.2 Current reporting practices
Probabilistic reporting appears to remain rare in the friction ridge discipline, despite its adoption by
a small number of FSPs and practitioners. Approximately 98% of friction ridge examiners surveyed
Table 9 (continued)
Number Theme Frequency
44. Protects incompetence 2
45. Reliance on technology 2
46. Score-based 2
47. Transparent 2
48. Wiggle room for witnesses 2
49. Wordy 2
50. World population paradigm 2
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report categorically using terms and phrases that are reminiscent of over a century of practice. This
is consistent with the findings of other studies in a variety of disciplines. In their analysis of mock
forensic reports from proficiency tests, Bali et al. (2020) found categorical statements in 100% of
toolmark reports, 100% of fibre analysis reports, 98% of firearms examination reports, 97% of glass
analysis reports, 93% of questioned documents reports, 87% of handwriting examination reports,
85% of paint analysis reports and 79% of shoeprint impression reports. Across all disciplines, 94%
of reports were categorical.9 Morrison et al. (2016) found that categorical reporting was by far the
most common for speaker identification results. One interesting observation from our survey is that
approximately 80% of the examiners surveyed who claimed to be reporting probabilistically gave
as examples statements that were actually categorical. This suggests some examiners may have a
false belief that they are reporting probabilistically and therefore may not recognize many of the
concerns over categoric reporting are applicable to them.
Even among those who report categorically, fewer than 10% appear to have adopted the ‘elabo-
rated’ approach espoused by SWGFAST as early as 2011. Nearly, a decade of calls by the scientific
community to move towards probabilistic reporting seem to have had limited impact. However, as
noted above, approximately one-third of respondents report categorically but responded in ways
that suggest they personally support probabilistic reporting. This indicates that some examiners may
be ‘captured’ by agency policy—reporting in a manner dictated by agency policy rather than by per-
sonal belief. This raises several open questions. Why is there such a large discrepancy between
examiners who support the idea of probabilistic reporting and those who actually practice it? Are
there some examiners whose reporting is inconsistent with what they personally believe is appropri-
ate? Or did these responses merely reflect the respondents’ perception that probabilistic reporting
was the ‘socially desirable’ answer?
5.3 Attitudes towards probabilistic reporting
Most respondents perceived probabilistic reporting as inappropriate for friction ridge analysis. Only
around one-third of our respondents described a shift towards probabilistic reporting as appropriate.
At the same time, it can reasonably be argued that finding approximately one-third of friction ridge
practitioners described probabilistic reporting as ‘appropriate’ would have been unthinkable as re-
cently as one decade ago, let alone two or three decades.
Longstanding ‘myths’ about friction ridge evidence—for example, the claim that the ‘uniqueness’
of friction ridge skin eliminates uncertainty in associations between friction ridge impressions—did
appear in our data, and so they cannot be considered ‘dead’ and still lurk behind the scenes (Cole,
2014). It should be emphasized, however, that they were uncommon among our survey respondent
population, who—precisely because they took the time to complete the survey—may reasonably be
presumed to more aware of, and interested in, current debates and developments within the
discipline.
In assessing the reasons respondents offered for their attitudes, it may be helpful to distinguish be-
tween what we might call ‘consumption’ issues—relating to how evidence is used by other criminal
justice system actors—and what we might call ‘technical’ issues concerning the merits of probabil-
istic reporting itself. Among the majority of respondents who viewed the shift towards probabilistic
9 It should be noted, however, that Bali et al. coded categorical statements ‘absent’ or ‘present’; thus, a single forensic re-
port could contain both a categorical and a probabilistic statement. We, in contrast, coded ‘categorical’ and ‘probabilistic’
mutually exclusively: a single statement could not be both probabilistic and categorical.
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reporting as inappropriate, the degree of concern about ‘consumption’ issues—fact-finder compre-
hension, prosecutor interests, and defence exploitation—is conspicuous. For example, from the data
in Table 8, we see that the primary reason respondents opposed probabilistic reporting was the con-
cern that defence attorneys will take advantage of the probabilistic conclusion to sow reasonable
doubt (79%). Respondents further supported this through a number of free text responses, such as:
‘I believe it will confuse the jury and give the defense a chance to place reasonable
doubt (425).
I don’t know why we would be testifying to ‘probable’ outcomes—it would make
cross examination significantly more difficult for the expert witness (310).
The conclusion that would essentially replace “identification”, in my opinion, could
easily be misunderstood by jurors as meaning that there is reasonable doubt in the
“same source” conclusion (409).’
This was closely followed by the concerns that judges, jurors, law enforcement and other investiga-
tors would not understand or know how to interpret the probabilistic conclusion language (79% and
69%, respectively). Similarly, the leading free-text reason for probabilistic reporting being inappropri-
ate was ‘jury confusion’, a related ‘consumption’ issue that continues to be the subject of on-going re-
search (Garrett and Mitchell, 2013; Langenburg et al., 2013; Thompson and Newman, 2015; Bayer
et al., 2016; Garrett et al., 2018; Thompson et al., 2018; Eldridge, 2019). When considering various
options for reporting, it seems reasonable for examiners to express concern whether consumers of those
reports are able to take appropriate action based on the information. However, whether the concerns
are warranted depend on how ‘confusion’ is being defined. Several of the free-text responses suggest
those respondents who view probabilistic reporting as inappropriate on the basis of ‘juror confusion’ do
so over claims that jurors want a binary answer of ‘yes’ or ‘no’, probabilistic language seems ‘wishy-
washy’, and expressing a probabilistic view does not align with the examiner’s belief that the two
impressions were made by the same source. For example, some respondents stated:
‘Why would we be needed if we used the term probabilistic. That means probably
him or her. SO if we say that then there is no need for fingerprint examiners. Then I
guess you could say he probably wasn’t there (199).
I think the matter is being overcomplicated and we are watering down our testimony,
which is a disservice to the victims (56).
Meaningless to jury, not accurate, wishy-washy (222).’
This leads us to question whether ‘juror confusion’ is being used as another way of expressing con-
cern that jurors might not place as much weight on the conclusion as the examiner believes they should
(compared to a traditional categoric identification conclusion).10 For example, one respondent stated:
10 Although, it is unclear how much weight ‘should’ be placed on the conclusion given traditional categoric statements
of single-source attribution have been criticized as unsupportable by individual scientists (e.g. Robertson, 1990; Stoney,
1991; Champod and Evett; 2001; Broeders, 2006,;Meuwly, 2006; Saks and Koehler, 2008; Cole, 2009; Page et al., 2011;
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‘Probabilistic Identification is Deceitful. The purpose of having Expert witness is so
they can state their belief; not force the blame on to the Jury (334).’
The respondent’s invocation of the notion of ‘blame’ is interesting. It recalls Wells’s (1992) re-
mark that fingerprint examiners’ testimony that their conclusion the person of interest is the source
of an unknown impression may be particularly persuasive to fact-finders because it satisfies a ‘bidir-
ectional test’: if the ultimate fact is wrong, the evidence must be wrong as well. As Wells notes, this
mode of reporting evidence shifts the moral hazard of legal decision-making from the fact-finder to
the expert. If the conclusion is wrong, the fact-finder can reason that they were misled by the expert.
Wells found that fact-finders prefer such evidence even to statistically equivalent evidence in which
the moral hazard is not assumed by the expert—the expert simply states the evidence, rather than
the probability of the ultimate fact (i.e. the posterior probability). The respondent above was not
merely willing to assume the moral hazard of the evidence; they appeared to perceive it as ‘deceit-
ful’ ‘not’ to. This position is in marked contrast to a common argument in forensic science which
insists that experts should report only the evidence (ENFSI, 2015). However, it is consistent with
our anecdotal impressions that many forensic experts genuinely believe that ‘the legal system’ pre-
fers, or even requires, them to state their beliefs about posterior probabilities, rather than confining
their reports to just the evidence. This may reflect a belief that the expert’s posteriors are superior to
the fact-finder’s, or it may simply reflect a sense of obligation.
Put in simple terms, respondents were less concerned that probabilistic reporting was ‘wrong’—
although there was certainly a significant number of respondents who espoused that view—than
they were that defence attorneys would take advantage of uncertainty or that it would mislead, or be
misunderstood by, other criminal justice system actors, such as jurors, judges, attorneys, and police
investigators. Arguably, such concerns are external to the discipline of friction ridge analysis and
belong the realm of policy, rather than science. Admittedly, this is a complicated issue and raises
questions as to the extent institutional factors could be at odds with scientific advancements for the
forensic sciences. It could be argued that this is a second-order problem and one that the forensic
scientist need not necessarily face alone. Instead, the “consumption problem” can reasonably be
construed as falling within the purview not solely of forensic scientists, but perhaps also of lawyers
and legal scholars, social scientists, educators, and policy-makers. Although it is clearly a barrier to
probabilistic reporting, whether it ‘should’ be a barrier to probabilistic reporting and how to mediate
practitioners’ concerns over these issues remain open questions.
Also of interest is the concern that ‘probabilistic reporting will cause the number of erroneous
associations to significantly increase’ shared by just over a quarter of the practitioner community.
This refers to an issue that has long lurked behind proposals for probabilistic reporting: that it would
enable the use of ‘more’ friction ridge evidence, not less, albeit evidence of more marginal value
(Champod and Evett, 2001). In this sense, respondents who agreed with this prompt may have been
expressing anxiety about the transition from the comforts of the categorical regime to the discom-
forts of the probabilistic. Under the categoric regime, experts could feel reassured by the belief that
the categorical regime was ostensibly conservative: evidence whose strength was less than over-
whelming was ruthlessly discarded, and thus it was believed that it was unlikely that comparisons
that fell into the ‘identification’ category would result in error. In a probabilistic regime, however,
all evidence, no matter how marginal, can in theory be reported. While these reports will be ‘truer’
Neumann et al., 2012; Eldridge, 2017) and a number of governmental and scientific reports (NRC, 2009; Campbell, 2011;
NIST, 2012; PCAST, 2016; AAAS, 2017).
24 H. SWOFFORD ET AL.
to the weight of the evidence and potentially provide more information for investigators and courts
to consider, if fact-finders interpret them as equivalent to the old categoric terms (e.g. ‘identifica-
tion’,) they could interpret the evidence as having ‘more’ weight than was intended by the examiner,
thus creating an opportunity for fact-finders to, e.g. improperly infer that a person of interest is ‘the’
source of an impression. Indeed, some free-text responses also touched on what we interpret to be
this concern:
‘I think it creates room for errors (326)
I am concerned with using probabilities because I think that it will wrongfully convict
someone based on a % of something that I wouldn’t consider reliable as a print exam-
iner (179).
I believe probabilistic language will confuse and mislead the jury. I think there will
be a spike in wrongful convictions (393).’
In contrast to the ‘consumption’ issues discussed above, only 15% of examiners reported that
they were motivated by concerns that their certification would be placed in jeopardy if they were to
report probabilistically. Feedback on this source of opposition was solicited to evaluate the influ-
ence of the historical policy of the IAI that codified longstanding culture at the time and formally
remained in effect for over 30 years. Between 1979 and 2010, the IAI officially opposed any testi-
mony or reporting of ‘possible, probable, or likely friction ridge identification’ with the threat of
formal charges of ‘conduct unbecoming’ and revocation of professional certification (IAI, 1979;
1980; 2010). This formal opposition to probabilistic reporting has undoubtedly shaped the perspec-
tives of many experienced practitioners. However, it appears to be less important to our respondents
than the ‘consumption’ issues.
5.4 Characterizations of probabilistic reporting
Our findings suggest that examiners’ characterizations of probabilistic reporting are quite diverse. A
review of Table 9 suggests that survey participants fell into two broad categories in responding to
this question. A significant number responded in what we might call ‘technical’ terms. They
responded by describing back to us what, technically, probabilistic reporting is: quantification, un-
certainty, ‘weight of evidence’ and so on. Some used specific types of measures, such as random
match probability and likelihood ratio. Given the current discourse around forensic interpretation in,
e.g. this journal, it is interesting that ‘Bayes’ Theorem’ was only mentioned once.
A second group responded to the question by treating ‘probabilistic reporting’ as an institutional
phenomenon. They described back to us what the move towards probabilistic represented within the
context of institutional debates over the role of forensic science in the criminal justice system. This
elicited a number of what we might call ‘skeptical’, and at times even cynical responses, e.g. ‘under-
mining of fingerprinting’, ‘unnecessary’, ‘driven by critics/self-serving agenda’, ‘disaster’, ‘mis-
leading’, ‘problematic’, ‘imprecise’, ‘protects incompetence’, ‘wiggle room for witnesses’, ‘wordy’,
‘baseless’, ‘guessing’, ‘hysteria’, ‘massive undertaking’, ‘meaningless’, ‘not a panacea for error’,
‘quantification for its own sake’, ‘scary to most examiners’, ‘scientific veneer’, ‘something we
don’t do’, ‘threatening to examiners careers’, ‘uncharted territory’ and ‘unhelpful’. One respondent
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described probabilistic reporting simply by: ‘Mt. Everest–we are going to lose many’. While we
admit that we are not entirely certain how to interpret that remark, it captures the general tone of
anxiety that pervaded many responses well enough that we feel it makes an appropriate title for this
article.
However, the same prompt also elicited many positive responses, e.g. ‘the way forward’,
‘transparent’, ‘appropriate’, ‘natural evolution of science’, ‘safer’ and ‘tool’. In retrospect, we
can see that the open-endedness of this prompt allowed respondents to choose whether to re-
spond in technical or non-technical terms and, to some extent, invited them to editorialize. As
with the responses to our other open-ended questions, one important observation is the hetero-
geneity of perspectives within the friction ridge discipline—not only as it relates to what it
means technically to report probabilistically, but also how examiners have characterized it as a
concept. These findings are important as they suggest that even among those who might be
welcoming of probabilistic reporting, there are many different perspectives as to what it means
and how it might be accomplished. We note, however, that it is possible respondents could
have been primed by previous survey questions, so we cannot be sure that these responses truly
reflect the respondents’ unadulterated opinions.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this survey was to provide proponents of probabilistic reporting with a sense of the
state of progress in one important forensic discipline: friction ridge examination. We found that
probabilistic reporting has not been widely adopted and remains extremely rare. Among those who
responded to our survey, 98% of respondents continue to report categorically with explicit or impli-
cit statements of certainty. Although we found that approximately one-third of respondents evinced
receptivity to probabilistic reporting, which may well represent a more receptive audience than
some might have expected, we also found that significant resistance to probabilistic reporting
remains across the discipline.
The most common reasons for opposition to probabilistic reporting, shared by approximately
80% of respondents, were that defence attorneys would take advantage of the uncertainties as a liti-
gation strategy and that probabilistic language would mislead, or be misunderstood by, other crim-
inal justice system actors, such as jurors, judges, attorneys and police investigators, respectively.
Free-text responses related to their opposition were diverse and not limited to issues of whether
probabilistic reporting is scientifically more appropriate. In fact, some respondents acknowledged
probabilistic reporting may be more scientifically appropriate yet continued to defend traditional
categoric reporting practices. Rather, attitudes towards probabilistic reporting appear to be influ-
enced by educational, philosophical, psychological and complex judicial implications and long-
standing cultural and institutional norms.
For forensic statisticians looking for guidance, we believe our findings offer three useful les-
sons. First, we would emphasize the sheer heterogeneity of the responses found in, e.g.
Tables 5–7. Practitioners’ perspectives, even on a narrowly framed issue such as probabilistic
reporting for a single forensic discipline, are quite varied and complex. This will present a
challenge to educators and trainers. They will not face a handful of widely held ‘myths’ that
they need to debunk or perspectives that they need to realign. Instead, they will face a diverse
array of strongly held opinions about what, if anything, ails the friction ridge discipline, how it
can and should be improved, and to what extent statistics offers a solution to those problems or
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would be the cause for other problems. Probabilistic reporting in latent print examination is
not a ‘bi-partisan’ issue; it is more complicated than that.
Secondly, we would direct readers’ attention to our finding that, what we have called ‘consump-
tion’ issues, seem to dominate respondents’ attitudes towards probabilistic reporting. This suggests
something important about where our respondents perceive the boundaries of their role as experts to
lie. Our respondents appear to believe that as experts, they are responsible not only for the evalu-
ation and articulation of the evidence, but also for how that evidence will be consumed by litigators
and the decisions about the evidence that ‘they believe’ fact-finders ‘should’ be making.
We believe the appropriate role of the expert is narrower. We believe that litigation strategies and
juror concerns are not within the remit of the forensic scientist to do forensic science properly.
Rather, we believe the role of the expert is to educate the fact-finder about the evidence and report
their findings within the limits of what the science can support, but leave it to litigators to fit that in-
formation into their arguments and to fact-finders to weigh that information when making their ul-
timate decisions. This requires experts to neutrally represent the evidence and clearly articulate the
strengths and limitations related to those findings so that fact-finders can make an informed deci-
sion, but resist the temptation to ‘simplify’ the evidence for fact-finder consumption (especially
when such simplifying would entail rounding the probative value of the evidence up, as when a
strong belief that two impressions derive from the same source is expressed as ‘the impressions ori-
ginate from the same source’). To be sure, we are not denying the importance of fact-finder compre-
hension of statistical evidence, which is well understood to be an important problem and is the
subject of a wealth of research. However, we are surprised at the degree to which bench practi-
tioners seem to understand it be ‘their’ problem as opposed to a problem for legal actors, psycholo-
gists, policy-makers, etc. This puts statisticians in a bind because many practitioners seem to view
probabilistic reporting inappropriate not because it is an incorrect way to report evidence, but rather
because fact-finders have difficulty in understanding statistics. The latter point is undoubtedly true,
but it also may well be an intractable problem. In this sense, concerns about consumption can begin
to seem like stalling tactics.
From our findings, few of the respondents appear to share this view. This is most evident in how
they approached several of the open-ended questions. When asked about the scientific merits of
probabilistic reporting over categoric reporting or how they characterize probabilistic, compared to
categoric, reporting they responded by discussing how such reporting language could be (mis)used
in court. This presents another challenge. If experts are expected to report their findings within ap-
propriate limits, the role of the expert will need to be clarified by policy-makers and enforced by the
judiciary. As long as experts are allowed to express their opinions categorically, they will continue
to do so. Proponents of probabilistic reporting, therefore, will need to not only include forensic sta-
tisticians, educators and trainers devising statistical tools and recommending reporting frameworks
for experts, but also policy-makers and members of the judiciary to require it of experts and enforce
it during litigation.
Thirdly, our survey suggests that many respondents do not share a common understanding of
what is meant by the term ‘probabilistic reporting’. We would point to the high number of respond-
ents who claimed to be reporting probabilistically but, in fact, were not. The survey results offer fo-
rensic statisticians ample further reasons for pessimism about their educational efforts thus far: the
insistence that uncertainty can be eliminated in friction ridge analysis, the claim that quantification
of friction ridges is impossible, the claim that a statistical model is ‘impossible’ for the same reason
claims of certainty are impossible, and the scepticism and mistrust directed towards statistics as a
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discipline. We might even go a step further and suggest that many respondents did not understand
what it means to report probabilistically or why categoric reporting, as we define it, has come under
so much criticism. However, this was not unexpected. When prompted, almost half of our respond-
ents (44%) acknowledged that they did not feel they sufficiently understand probabilities and would
not be able to properly testify. This was further evident in some of the free-text responses to other
questions. For example:
‘Probabilistic language is currently very confusing to me and I would need a lot more
training and understanding of it, before I would be comfortable putting it in a report
and testifying to it in a courtroom setting (117).
I agree that the shift toward probabilistic language is appropriate but I still don’t fully
understand the impact at this time and have had no training on the subject of probabil-
istic language yet (108).
For the latent examiner not as comfortable with explaining statistics and probability,
it could open the door for the attorney to discredit the examiner. That is not only prob-
lematic for the case it could be detrimental for the examiner’s career (103).’
We are sympathetic to this concern because it has never been a formal requirement for practi-
tioners to have any background knowledge in principles of probabilities and statistics. This presents
yet another challenge: if practitioners are expected to testify using probabilistic language, it will re-
quire a coordinated investment by forensic science administrators, educators and trainers to ensure
practitioners have the fundamental education and training on probabilistic and statistical principles
so that they understand what they are reporting and feel comfortable and confident in their own
knowledge on the subject. For example, as one respondent suggested:
‘As a scientist, I understand why the community cannot testify to absolutes in terms
of “identification”. The reasoning behind that argument is sound. However, I think it
will take a change in the dogma of the science to get practitioners to 1) understand
probabilities and what they’re actually reporting (and that their ultimate conclusion is
not actually changing), and 2) want to change how they testify/report their findings
(because they are accustomed to “this is how I’ve always done it”) (30).’
It will also require outreach to attorneys and judges so that they understand the transition and
what it means. This will require more than a mere policy-change; it will require a commitment by
forensic science administrators, educators, trainers, practitioners and policy-makers to address the
foundational gaps in education and training curricula as well as establish operational environments
that are conducive to allowing practitioners to explore what it means to report probabilistically and
how to do so in a way that they are comfortable with. This is important because the transition to
probabilistic reporting should not be done in haste. Fortunately, though, probabilistic reporting, as
we define it, does not necessarily require the use of numerical quantities, algorithms and other statis-
tical tools or the reporting of evidence along a full continuum, although those measures are pre-
ferred by some. Instead, it can be achieved by simply avoiding claims that an individual is ‘the’
source of an impression or using terms that imply certainty for single-source attribution. As
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practitioners and stakeholders gain comfort with reporting using probabilistic language for compari-
sons which would normally be categorized as ‘identification’ under traditional categoric reporting
schemes, it can be expanded along the continuum to include more marginal comparisons that still
provide useful information, but do not warrant stronger conclusions. The use of numerical quanti-
ties, algorithms, and other statistical tools will provide more precise information related to the
strength of the evidence, but this transition need not be done in a single act nor contingent upon the
availability of such technologies.
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Appendix A
Dear Analyst, I am an investigator for CSAFE, the Centre for Statistical Applications in
Forensic Evidence (http://forensicstats.org/), and a Professor in the Department of
Criminology, Law & Society at the University of California, Irvine. CSAFE has partnerships
with many forensic laboratories including the Midwest Forensic Resource Centre. As you
probably know, CASFE was named a Forensic Science Centre for Excellence by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to ‘support NIST’s efforts to advance the utility of prob-
abilistic methods to enhance forensic analysis’. As part of this mission, we are conducting a
survey of forensic practitioners about current practices regarding probabilistic reporting of fo-
rensic results. We are particularly interested in your experiences with probabilistic reporting.
We request your participation in this survey. You are eligible to participate in this study if you
are 18 years of age or older and a forensic practitioner. Please note that your participation in
this study is completely voluntary and declining to participate will not in any way affect your
standing with your employer. There are no direct benefits from participation in the study.
However, this study may help us better understand the impact of probabilistic reporting on
practitioners. We expect the survey to take around 60 minutes. We thank you in advance for
your cooperation.
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Appendix B
The closed-response survey question in which participants were asked to choose which of three
sample statements most closely resembled the wording they currently used in reports of an associ-
ation between two friction ridge impressions.
Question: Which of the following most closely resembles the language used in your written
examination reports when reporting an association between two prints in your practice?
A. ‘The latent print on Exhibit ## was identified to the standards bearing the name XXXX”.//
**OR**//’There is sufficient quality and quantity of detail in agreement to conclude that the
latent print on Exhibit ## and the standards bearing the name XXXX originated from the
same source. ‘//**OR**//”The latent print on Exhibit ## matched the standards bearing the
name XXXX’.
B. ‘The latent print on Exhibit ## and the standards bearing the name XXXX have corresponding
ridge detail. The likelihood of observing this amount of correspondence when two impres-
sions are made by different sources is considered extremely low.’//**OR**// ‘The latent print
on Exhibit ## and the standards bearing the name XXXX have corresponding ridge detail.
This amount of correspondence provides extremely strong support for the proposition the two
impressions were made by the same source rather than by different sources.’//**OR**// ‘The
latent print on Exhibit ## and the standards bearing the name XXXX have corresponding
ridge detail. The probability of observing this amount of correspondence is approximately ##
times greater when impressions are made by the same source rather than by different
sources.’
C. ‘The features within the impressions are clear and there is an abundant amount of consist-
ency (much more than needed to arrive at a conclusion) with no inconsistencies. The conclu-
sion is easily demonstrable to others and others would be hard pressed to find any reasons to
doubt the conclusion. There is a large amount of data that infers that the latent impression
was deposited by XXXX.’
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Appendix C
A full listing of all the statements for which researcher coding conflicted with self-report.
Number Statements self-reported as ‘categorical’ but coded by researchers as ‘probabilistic’
1. Item ###. The partial latent print of value has characteristics in agreement with the
fingerprint/palm print impressions of XXX, Item ###, (finger # & label/left or right
palm). In the opinion of this examiner the likelihood that the impressions were
made by a different source other than the one listed is very small.
2. I am of the opinion that the latent prints from item #X and exemplar fingerprints from
XXX likely originated from the same source.
Number Statements self-reported as ‘probabilistic’ but coded by researchers as ‘categorical’
1. Amount of agreement between two impressions is compelling, inferring both origi-
nated from the same individual (i.e. it is not plausible that the impression originated
from a different source).
2. ‘The likelihood the ff. print impressions were made by another source is so remote
that it is considered a practical impossibility’
3. Print Quality: Sufficient for a comparison and an ABIS search. The XX finger of
(name/DOB/record#) was identified as having made this print. This is followed by a
qualifying statement: Identification: the decision by a qualified examiner, that two
friction ridge impressions originated from the same source. The features present in
the two impressions are in sufficient correspondence, and the probability the ques-
tioned impression was made by a different source is so small, it is negligible.
4. he latent print on exhibit ## and the exemplars bearing the name XXX have corre-
sponding ridge detail. The likelihood of encountering this much correspondence be-
tween two different individuals is considered extremely low and I have discounted
it.
5. The likelihood the following print impressions were made by another (different)
source is so remote that it is considered as a practical impossibility:
6. The impression on the latent card was made by the same source as the known finger-
print/palm print standards as XXXX
7. Prints recovered from Item XXXX have been analysed, compared evaluated and iden-
tified with the known prints of XXXX. The card bearing the know prints of XXXX
used in this identification was obtained on ‘DATE’ by ‘NAME’, an employee of
‘WORKPLACE’. Source identification is the opinion of the examiner that two fric-
tion ridge skin impressions originated from the same source. This opinion is the de-
cision that the features are in sufficient correspondence and that the probability the
questioned impression was made by a different source is so small that it is
negligible.
8. The latent lift labelled L-1 was labelled as being lifted from the _____ by Officer
____. It is my conclusion that the latent lift labelled L-1 was made by the right
thumb of ______.
(Continued)
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9. Identification to Name, SID # along with this statement, An identification does not ne-
cessarily eliminate the possibility that another person in the world could leave a
print with areas of similar agreement. Identification means that within the exam-
iner’s experience and knowledge, no other prints with this much similarity have
come from different people.
10. The latent prints of comparison value were compared to the standards for XXX with
the following conclusions: F1A—Identified to the right middle finger
11. Latent print card 1 of 1, collected from ‘insert’, has been identified to the right thumb
of the fingerprint cared bearing the name XYZ
12. The latent print, L-X, was identified as the XXXX XXXXX of XXXX XXXX XXXX.
13. Latent impression on lift 0450 originated from the same source as the known right
index finger of . . .. . .
14. I formed the opinion that fingerprint R1 and the known fingerprint of XXXX were
made by the same finger.
15. Latent # is identified as the number . . . finger of John Doe
16. A visual examination of LL#1 and the ### finger of fingerprint card bearing the name
XXXX have sufficient detail to conclude an identification.
17. “identified”
18. A match was made between John Doe ********* and the latent print lifted from the
inside passenger door’s window by **************. The match was verified by
****************
19. Suitable detail within ‘R2’, has been compared with the fingerprint images associated
with a Form RCMP C- 216/booking record dated 2017-04-27 bearing the name and
particulars of subject. . . SUBJECT KO ##### d.o.b. 1992-05-21 . . .specifically with
the impression image(s) of the LEFT THUMB. In the Evaluation phase of the ACE-
V process, I considered all of the information gathered during Analysis and
Comparison to reach conclusions about the origin of the latent print. As a result of
the evaluation of corresponding ridge features observed during comparison, the
writer concluded INDIVIDUALIZATION (2), in other words that the impressions
from both sources (R2 <> Lt. Thumb print from record of SUBJECT) were caused
by the same donor person. The Verification step of the ACE-V (1) process consists
of an independent and blind application of the ACE process by a subsequent exam-
iner to either support or refute the conclusions of the original examiner. In the case
of the individualized impression(s) above, a vetted version of the case file was for-
warded to the FSU Blind Verification Coordinator for assignment to a second ana-
lyst for verification or invalidation. D/Cst. *******conducted this review and
reported conclusion(s) back to the coordinator. There were no conflicts of opinion.
*Note #1***”Notice(s) of Intention—Expert Opinion/Report” under s.657.3 CCC
should be served upon the accused or his/her counsel at least 30 days prior to trial
date for the introduction of expert testimony. See images for Draft copy of this
Form. ***Note #2***Should the introduction of fingerprint evidence be required at
trial, the following individuals should be included on the list of witnesses; Cst.
******** - recovered prints—submitted for analysis S/Cst. ********* - analysed,
compared, identified fingerprint R2 D/Cst *****conducted independent comparison
process verifying conclusion(s) S/Cst. tba- Cell Officer who fingerprints the subject,
(Continued)
32 H. SWOFFORD ET AL.
if arrested, for this general occurrence.***Note #3***The presence of a friction
ridge print on an item of evidence indicates contact was made between the
source and the item of evidence. The presence of a friction ridge print alone
does not necessarily indicate the significance of either the contact or the time
frame during which the contact occurred.(1) ACE-V—The acronym for a scien-
tific method: Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (see individual
terms at www.swgfast.org).(2) Individualization -The decision by an examiner
that there are sufficient features in agreement to conclude that two areas of friction
ridge impressions originated from the same source (donor). Individualization of an
impression to one source is the decision that the likelihood the impression was
made by another (different) source is so remote that it is considered as a practical
impossibility.
20. The writer has compared fingerprint impression”R#” described as from ‘location of
impression’, with the fingerprint images appearing on a form RCMP-C216 bearing
the name, particulars, and portrait image of Name (DOB: YYYY-MM-DD) KO
#######, FPS ########. As a result of the evaluation of corresponding detail
observed during this comparison phase, the writer has concluded individualization’
in other words that the fingerprints from the aforementioned sources, the latent
print ‘R#’, and the ‘specified digit’ fingerprint purported to be that of Name, were
caused by the same donor-person. Individualization—The decision by an examiner
that there are sufficient features in agreement to conclude that two areas of friction
ridge impressions originated from the same source (donor). Individualization of an
impression to one source is the decision that the likelihood the impression was
made by another (different) source is so remote that it is considered as a practical
impossibility.
21. the Latent print was identified to XXXX
22. impression x was identified as the such and such finger/palm of John Doe (sid#). den-
tification is the opinion of an examiner that there is sufficient quality and quantity
of detail in agreement to conclude that two impressions originated from the same
source.
23. Latent print X was identified to the exemplars bearing the name X
24. I compared the latent print from card (#) to the tenprint card of (subjects name)
using the ACE-V method. I identified the latent print as being made by the
(# finger/palm) of (subjects name). The identification was verified by (Forensic
Specialist).
25. Latent(s) XX was/were compared to the exemplar prints bearing the name(s) of the
above listed subject(s) and was/were IDENTIFIED in the following manner:
26. Comparison of the latent print to the known prints listed above revealed there is
sufficient information in agreement based upon features, sequence, and spatial
relationship to conclude that the latent fingerprint of Lab Item #1 was made by
the same individual whose known prints appear on Lab Item 2.
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